chore(deps): update module golang.org/x/crypto to v0.35.0 [security] (release-0.29) #355
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This PR contains the following updates:
v0.14.0->v0.35.0Man-in-the-middle attacker can compromise integrity of secure channel in golang.org/x/crypto
CGA-q6qg-q8q4-44x7 / CGA-v7c4-rcx6-g4vr / CGA-wvh7-h2xx-5852 / CGA-xx28-qv2j-6r3q / CVE-2023-48795 / GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8 / GO-2023-2402
More information
Details
A protocol weakness allows a MITM attacker to compromise the integrity of the secure channel before it is established, allowing the attacker to prevent transmission of a number of messages immediately after the secure channel is established without either side being aware.
The impact of this attack is relatively limited, as it does not compromise confidentiality of the channel. Notably this attack would allow an attacker to prevent the transmission of the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message, disabling a handful of newer security features.
This protocol weakness was also fixed in OpenSSH 9.6.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Prefix Truncation Attack against ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC aka Terrapin
CGA-q6qg-q8q4-44x7 / CGA-v7c4-rcx6-g4vr / CGA-wvh7-h2xx-5852 / CGA-xx28-qv2j-6r3q / CVE-2023-48795 / GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8 / GO-2023-2402
More information
Details
Summary
Terrapin is a prefix truncation attack targeting the SSH protocol. More precisely, Terrapin breaks the integrity of SSH's secure channel. By carefully adjusting the sequence numbers during the handshake, an attacker can remove an arbitrary amount of messages sent by the client or server at the beginning of the secure channel without the client or server noticing it.
Mitigations
To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes.
Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.
As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available.
Details
The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*[email protected] MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario.
The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange.
In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers.
For more details see https://terrapin-attack.com.
Impact
This attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*[email protected]), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Misuse of connection.serverAuthenticate may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
CVE-2024-45337 / GHSA-v778-237x-gjrc / GO-2024-3321
More information
Details
Applications and libraries which misuse connection.serverAuthenticate (via callback field ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback) may be susceptible to an authorization bypass.
The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions.
For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key.
Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth.
Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
CVE-2024-45337 / GHSA-v778-237x-gjrc / GO-2024-3321
More information
Details
Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass.
The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions.
For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key.
Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/[email protected] enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth.
Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Potential denial of service in golang.org/x/crypto
CVE-2025-22869 / GO-2025-3487
More information
Details
SSH servers which implement file transfer protocols are vulnerable to a denial of service attack from clients which complete the key exchange slowly, or not at all, causing pending content to be read into memory, but never transmitted.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
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