Rust 1.86.0 lints (#7254)

Implement lints for the new Rust compiler version 1.86.0.

Author: macladson

beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/beacon_chain.rs

@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> BeaconChain<T> {
     ///
     /// - `slot` always increases by `1`.
     /// - Skipped slots contain the root of the closest prior
-    ///     non-skipped slot (identical to the way they are stored in `state.block_roots`).
+    ///   non-skipped slot (identical to the way they are stored in `state.block_roots`).
     /// - Iterator returns `(Hash256, Slot)`.
     ///
     /// Will return a `BlockOutOfRange` error if the requested start slot is before the period of
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> BeaconChain<T> {
     ///
     /// - `slot` always decreases by `1`.
     /// - Skipped slots contain the root of the closest prior
-    ///     non-skipped slot (identical to the way they are stored in `state.block_roots`) .
+    ///   non-skipped slot (identical to the way they are stored in `state.block_roots`) .
     /// - Iterator returns `(Hash256, Slot)`.
     /// - The provided `block_root` is included as the first item in the iterator.
     pub fn rev_iter_block_roots_from(
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> BeaconChain<T> {
     /// - `slot` always decreases by `1`.
     /// - Iterator returns `(Hash256, Slot)`.
     /// - As this iterator starts at the `head` of the chain (viz., the best block), the first slot
-    ///     returned may be earlier than the wall-clock slot.
+    ///   returned may be earlier than the wall-clock slot.
     pub fn rev_iter_state_roots_from<'a>(
         &'a self,
         state_root: Hash256,

beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/beacon_proposer_cache.rs

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ pub fn compute_proposer_duties_from_head<T: BeaconChainTypes>(
 /// - Returns an error if `state.current_epoch() > target_epoch`.
 /// - No-op if `state.current_epoch() == target_epoch`.
 /// - It must be the case that `state.canonical_root() == state_root`, but this function will not
-///     check that.
+///   check that.
 pub fn ensure_state_is_in_epoch<E: EthSpec>(
     state: &mut BeaconState<E>,
     state_root: Hash256,

beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/block_verification.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 //! - Verification for gossip blocks (i.e., should we gossip some block from the network).
 //! - Verification for normal blocks (e.g., some block received on the RPC during a parent lookup).
 //! - Verification for chain segments (e.g., some chain of blocks received on the RPC during a
-//!    sync).
+//!   sync).
 //!
 //! The primary source of complexity here is that we wish to avoid doing duplicate work as a block
 //! moves through the verification process. For example, if some block is verified for gossip, we

beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/early_attester_cache.rs

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ pub struct CacheItem<E: EthSpec> {
 ///
 /// - Produce an attestation without using `chain.canonical_head`.
 /// - Verify that a block root exists (i.e., will be imported in the future) during attestation
-///     verification.
+///   verification.
 /// - Provide a block which can be sent to peers via RPC.
 #[derive(Default)]
 pub struct EarlyAttesterCache<E: EthSpec> {

beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/eth1_finalization_cache.rs

@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ pub mod tests {
                     let last_finalized_eth1 = eth1s_by_count
                         .range(0..(finalized_deposits + 1))
                         .map(|(_, eth1)| eth1)
-                        .last()
+                        .next_back()
                         .cloned();
                     assert_eq!(
                         eth1cache.finalize(finalized_checkpoint),

beacon_node/beacon_chain/tests/payload_invalidation.rs

@@ -1283,7 +1283,7 @@ impl InvalidHeadSetup {
     ///
     /// 1. A chain where the only viable head block has an invalid execution payload.
     /// 2. A block (`fork_block`) which will become the head of the chain when
-    ///     it is imported.
+    ///    it is imported.
     async fn new() -> InvalidHeadSetup {
         let slots_per_epoch = E::slots_per_epoch();
         let mut rig = InvalidPayloadRig::new().enable_attestations();

beacon_node/execution_layer/src/lib.rs

@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ impl<E: EthSpec> ExecutionLayer<E> {
     ///
     /// - `Some(true)` if the given `block_hash` is the terminal proof-of-work block.
     /// - `Some(false)` if the given `block_hash` is certainly *not* the terminal proof-of-work
-    ///     block.
+    ///   block.
     /// - `None` if the `block_hash` or its parent were not present on the execution engine.
     /// - `Err(_)` if there was an error connecting to the execution engine.
     ///

beacon_node/lighthouse_network/src/peer_manager/mod.rs

@@ -992,23 +992,23 @@ impl<E: EthSpec> PeerManager<E> {
     /// - Do not prune outbound peers to exceed our outbound target.
     /// - Do not prune more peers than our target peer count.
     /// - If we have an option to remove a number of peers, remove ones that have the least
-    ///     long-lived subnets.
+    ///   long-lived subnets.
     /// - When pruning peers based on subnet count. If multiple peers can be chosen, choose a peer
-    ///     that is not subscribed to a long-lived sync committee subnet.
+    ///   that is not subscribed to a long-lived sync committee subnet.
     /// - When pruning peers based on subnet count, do not prune a peer that would lower us below the
-    ///     MIN_SYNC_COMMITTEE_PEERS peer count. To keep it simple, we favour a minimum number of sync-committee-peers over
-    ///     uniformity subnet peers. NOTE: We could apply more sophisticated logic, but the code is
-    ///     simpler and easier to maintain if we take this approach. If we are pruning subnet peers
-    ///     below the MIN_SYNC_COMMITTEE_PEERS and maintaining the sync committee peers, this should be
-    ///     fine as subnet peers are more likely to be found than sync-committee-peers. Also, we're
-    ///     in a bit of trouble anyway if we have so few peers on subnets. The
-    ///     MIN_SYNC_COMMITTEE_PEERS
-    ///     number should be set low as an absolute lower bound to maintain peers on the sync
-    ///     committees.
+    ///   MIN_SYNC_COMMITTEE_PEERS peer count. To keep it simple, we favour a minimum number of sync-committee-peers over
+    ///   uniformity subnet peers. NOTE: We could apply more sophisticated logic, but the code is
+    ///   simpler and easier to maintain if we take this approach. If we are pruning subnet peers
+    ///   below the MIN_SYNC_COMMITTEE_PEERS and maintaining the sync committee peers, this should be
+    ///   fine as subnet peers are more likely to be found than sync-committee-peers. Also, we're
+    ///   in a bit of trouble anyway if we have so few peers on subnets. The
+    ///   MIN_SYNC_COMMITTEE_PEERS
+    ///   number should be set low as an absolute lower bound to maintain peers on the sync
+    ///   committees.
     /// - Do not prune trusted peers. NOTE: This means if a user has more trusted peers than the
-    ///     excess peer limit, all of the following logic is subverted as we will not prune any peers.
-    ///     Also, the more trusted peers a user has, the less room Lighthouse has to efficiently manage
-    ///     its peers across the subnets.
+    ///   excess peer limit, all of the following logic is subverted as we will not prune any peers.
+    ///   Also, the more trusted peers a user has, the less room Lighthouse has to efficiently manage
+    ///   its peers across the subnets.
     ///
     /// Prune peers in the following order:
     /// 1. Remove worst scoring peers

beacon_node/lighthouse_network/src/peer_manager/peerdb.rs

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ impl<E: EthSpec> PeerDB<E> {
         matches!(
             self.connection_status(peer_id),
             Some(PeerConnectionStatus::Disconnected { .. })
-                | Some(PeerConnectionStatus::Unknown { .. })
+                | Some(PeerConnectionStatus::Unknown)
                 | None
         ) && !self.score_state_banned_or_disconnected(peer_id)
     }
@@ -776,8 +776,8 @@ impl<E: EthSpec> PeerDB<E> {
                 NewConnectionState::Connected { .. }          // We have established a new connection (peer may not have been seen before)
                     | NewConnectionState::Disconnecting { .. }// We are disconnecting from a peer that may not have been registered before
                     | NewConnectionState::Dialing { .. }      // We are dialing a potentially new peer
-                    | NewConnectionState::Disconnected { .. } // Dialing a peer that responds by a different ID can be immediately
-                                                              // disconnected without having being stored in the db before
+                    | NewConnectionState::Disconnected // Dialing a peer that responds by a different ID can be immediately
+                                                       // disconnected without having being stored in the db before
             ) {
                 warn!(log_ref, "Updating state of unknown peer";
                     "peer_id" => %peer_id, "new_state" => ?new_state);

beacon_node/lighthouse_network/src/rpc/codec.rs

@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ mod tests {
         let mut block: BeaconBlockBellatrix<_, FullPayload<Spec>> =
             BeaconBlockBellatrix::empty(&Spec::default_spec());
         let tx = VariableList::from(vec![0; 1024]);
-        let txs = VariableList::from(std::iter::repeat(tx).take(5000).collect::<Vec<_>>());
+        let txs = VariableList::from(std::iter::repeat_n(tx, 5000).collect::<Vec<_>>());
 
         block.body.execution_payload.execution_payload.transactions = txs;
 
@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ mod tests {
         let mut block: BeaconBlockBellatrix<_, FullPayload<Spec>> =
             BeaconBlockBellatrix::empty(&Spec::default_spec());
         let tx = VariableList::from(vec![0; 1024]);
-        let txs = VariableList::from(std::iter::repeat(tx).take(100000).collect::<Vec<_>>());
+        let txs = VariableList::from(std::iter::repeat_n(tx, 100000).collect::<Vec<_>>());
 
         block.body.execution_payload.execution_payload.transactions = txs;