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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<html>
<head>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, Epilogue</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h1>Epilogue</h1>
<p>
After eight years - May 1961 to July 1969 - the Apollo program,
overcoming obstacles and tragedy, accomplished the goal set by the
nation. Americans had walked on the moon and returned to talk about it.
Preeminence in space flight, an oftstated objective, had been achieved
in such style that the two-nation space race was seldom mentioned again,
except by those who doubted that the Russians had ever intended to send
men to the moon. What was achieved toward long-range progress and in
contributions to science or national interest will be argued for years,
perhaps decades. At the outset, however, little but public support for
the program was heard. The direction of the manned space flight program
followed the sentiments of Congress, the people, and members of the
scientific community, who - tired of hearing about Soviet technological
successes - reasoned that America needed to marshal its forces to catch
up. Landing men on the moon seemed the best way to demonstrate this
nation's prowess to the world. The possibility that there might, or
might not, be any long-range gains was not really considered until this
country faced new pressures that pushed reassessment of priorities. But
even during the turmoil of domestic troubles and international problems,
there were those who insisted that manned space flight, including
walking on the moon, contributed materially to the well-being of
mankind, citing especially the technological explosion that Apollo
helped to trigger.<p>
Although mutterings against the need for such a program grew during the
later years, there was no change in the national objective to land men
on the moon. Apollo received what it needed in money and support, even
during the time of tragedy and severest test. But the complexity and
immensity of Apollo kept attention narrowly focused on the aim of
getting men safely on and off the moon, leaving little time or talent
available to plan the exploitation of the technology, enlist scientists
to share in the manned space flight program, and frame some kind of
program to follow Apollo.<p>
By 1965, the spacecraft and the Saturn V still faced technical problems,
but design and development had reached a point where manufacturing,
production, and qualification could be expected to start soon, giving
NASA its first opportunity to pause and look ahead. The agency's top
administrators, who had seen Apollo through budgetary and congressional
hearings, were dubious of suggestions that landing men on Mars should be
the next step. Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden said a few months before
his death in December of that year, "I don't think you'll ever get
another commitment out of the nation like [Apollo]. You just can't
guarantee to make a national commitment that will extend over 8 or 10
years."<a href = "#source1"><b>1</b></a> At that time, Apollo's
price tag was $3 billion a year; no matter how sound a long-range plan
NASA might have presented, it is unlikely that the President, the
Congress, and the American taxpayer, faced with the social and
international pressures and turmoil of the middle years of the decade,
would have supported a program to send men to the planets.<p>
NASA might have wanted to aim for a planetary voyage, but the agency
consensus was that it was best to amortize a significant percentage of
Apollo's costs in near-earth orbital operations.<a href =
"#source2"><b>2</b></a> This decision led to a series of program
planning steps - from the Apollo Extension System to Apollo Applications
and finally to Skylab. For some time, this planning included exploring
the moon after the first landing. In late 1967, however, NASA officials
decided that all lunar landing missions should be part of the Apollo
program. These flights were therefore transferred to a Lunar Exploration
Office, established on 19 December at Headquarters and headed by Lee R.
Scherer, former Lunar Orbiter Program manager at Langley.<a href =
"#source3"><b>3</b></a><p>
Scherer's group first tried to determine the content and objectives of
these forthcoming lunar landings. It studied the use of a lunar flying
unit, roving vehicles of various kinds, an extended lunar module (ELM) to
land larger payloads on the moon, and an unmanned logistics system,
perhaps launched by a Titan III-Centaur, that could supplement the ELM
payload or form a lunar base shelter, among other things.<p>
Director Robert Gilruth of the Manned Spacecraft Center favored
upgrading Apollo's capabilities to support limited exploration and
thought NASA should move more rapidly to this end. Gilruth wrote manned
space flight head George Mueller at Headquarters of his concerns in
March and again in April of 1968, pointing out that the President's
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) had gone on record that it would
support no more than two or three lunar landings that met engineering
goals only. PSAC wanted Apollo to stay on the moon longer, to provide
the crews with more range and mobility, and to carry a scientific
payload big enough to justify the mission. These were large
undertakings, and yet the impression had been created, Gilruth said,
that NASA could wait a year before starting on these tasks. And that
impression prevailed. Gilruth needed money to begin the work,<a href =
"#source4"><b>4</b></a> but it was 1969 before any contracts to develop
or modify hardware were awarded.<p>
In October 1968, Gilruth set up a Lunar Exploration Working Group in
Houston and appointed John Hodge to manage it. Hodge was well aware of
the limited budget outlook and tried to plan lunar exploration missions
that used only improved Apollo hardware, to avoid developing new major
systems. Hodge focused the initial work of his group on extending the
lander's capability.<a href = "#source5"><b>5</b></a><p>
The pressures that brought changes in how much Apollo would carry to the
moon also affected choices of the sites it would visit. Very early in
the program - 1961 - Homer Newell had asked scientist Harold Urey to
suggest sites of interest. Urey submitted a list of areas that extended
over the face of the moon. But the lunar-orbit mode that was then
becoming the accepted route confined the landings to within a few
degrees of the lunar equator. In early 1968, at Apollo Director Samuel
Phillips' request, John Eggleston and John Sevier, among others in
Houston, began searching for feasible areas outside the so-called Apollo
zone. Wilmot Hess asked Chris Kraft if his flight operations people
could find some way to relax this equatorial zone restriction. Kraft
answered that many of the constraints were crew safety provisions that
could never be entirely eliminated, but some of the trajectories might
be modified to save fuel. If propellant capacities on the vehicles could
be increased, more sites on the face of the moon might be visited.
Studies were soon in progress on two target areas frequently mentioned,
lunar craters Copernicus and Tycho.<a href = "#source6"><b>6</b></a><p>
Although the technologists realized by 1968 that scientific experiments
could no longer be considered just "add-on pieces of equipment
resulting in minimum modifications to space vehicles," so many
unknowns remained for the first lunar landing that the size of the
Apollo lunar surface experiments package (ALSEP) was reduced. But the
engineers agreed that a full-scale ALSEP should be flown on a later
mission. Moreover, they had begun to accept the idea that a successful
first landing might warrant flying to a more scientifically interesting
spot on the second mission - but one still within the ellipse of the
Apollo zone. The procedure was called biasing the flight; in early 1969,
the planners decided to bias a landing to the vicinity of a Surveyor
spacecraft already resting on the lunar surface.<a href =
"#source7"><b>7</b></a><p>
By late 1968, there were indications that the lunar module would soon be
accepted for flight. Hodge was then under pressure to get these vehicles
modified to support the lunar exploration program. By February 1969, his
group had written and rewritten a statement of work for the task. In
late April, Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager George Low buttonholed
Phillips and asked when Houston could start on the engineering
modifications for the exploration vehicles. Phillips authorized funds
for the work through the first week in May, when he would take another
look at the requirements. Mueller evidently liked the changes. On 26 May
he advised NASA's new Administrator, Thomas Paine, that Houston had been
instructed to modify the command module, starting with CM-112, to carry
additional fuel and a scientific instrument module and to extend the
staytime of LM-10 and subsequent spacecraft and to increase their
payloads. Mueller expected the improved craft to be ready for flight by
September 1970.<a href = "#source8"><b>8</b></a><p>
After the <cite>Apollo 9</cite> flight in March 1969, when the lunar
module did everything it would do in lunar flight except land on the
moon, NASA added another letter to its lunar landing alphabet. Following
the G mission (the first landing), all flights would be designated H.
This meant that these missions would carry a complete ALSEP, stay on the
lunar surface up to 35 instead of 22 hours, provide for two walks by the
crews for a total of 6 hours rather than one walk for 3 hours, and
permit a walking range of 900 instead of 100 meters away from the lunar
module. A Bellcomm study that month showed that, with modifications to
the trajectories and procedures, "the entire face of the moon"
could be considered as the Apollo zone. With this encouragement, and the
near certainty that <cite>Apollo 11</cite> would be successful, the
Astro Geology Branch of the United States Geological Survey asked that
the crews of the H missions visit both the "Eastern" (old) and
"Western" (new) maria. The Apollo Site Selection Board heard a
presentation on 10 July for a Western mare landing, and Mueller told
Paine on 29 July that the next flight would aim for a landing in that
area, in Oceanus Procellarum, only about 200 meters from <cite>Surveyor
III'</cite>s landing point. In August, André Meyer was more than
mildly upset that the mission planners were not giving enough priority
to retrieving some Surveyor hardware.<a href =
"#source9"><b>9</b></a><p>
Mueller on 23 May 1969 had picked the lunar roving vehicle, to be housed
in the descent stage of the lander, as the way to extend the range and
capabilities of the exploration missions (later called J missions). All
discussion of unmanned logistic landers for lunar shelters and bases
ceased. Marshall Space Flight Center, directing the development of the
rover, issued a request for proposals to industry on 11 July and
followed that with a bidders' briefing at Michoud two weeks later. Low
talked with Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin after the <cite>Apollo
11</cite> flight and learned that Armstrong thought it would be just as
easy getting around on foot as on the roving vehicle. Moreover, the crew
said it was easy to carry tools to wherever they were needed and bring
them and the samples back. Meyer disagreed with the astronauts, pointing
out that they had not trained on the one-sixth-g trainer, which had
shown that fatigue would limit the distance moon walkers could travel.
Tests had indicated that the loping gait suggested by Armstrong would
produce some very tired crews. Marshall evaluated the proposals in
August and awarded a contract to Boeing in October. Apollo had its
"moon buggy," scheduled for missions to be flown in 1971 and
1972.<a href = "#source10"><b>10</b></a><p>
Intervals between flights were discussed from time to time, with six
months being mentioned most often. Mueller, who reportedly favored three
to five lunar exploration flights a year, decided to fly one every ten
weeks until the lunar landing. The investigators of the lunar sample
experiments had petitioned NASA to launch the second landing mission no
sooner than six months after the first. Mission planners and engineers,
who had found flying five missions between October 1968 and July 1969 a
grueling task, agreed with the scientists. If <cite>Apollo 11</cite> did
not land on the moon, Mueller intended to follow it with flights in
September and December, or until the national objective was reached.
After the visit of Armstrong and Aldrin to Tranquility Base, Mueller
relaxed the pressure. Charles Conrad, Alan Bean, and Richard Gordon did
not fly <cite>Apollo 12</cite> until mid-November - not six months
later, but at least double the intervals between the first five
flights.<a href = "#source11"><b>11</b></a><p>
After <cite>Apollo 11,</cite> laboratories all over the country and in a
number of others had stacks of data tapes and lunar samples to study,
and the promise of more of each from the later flights, but this
abundance did not alleviate the discontent of some members of the
scientific community. Their main charge was that the scientists had no
part in NASA's decision-making and no effective representation among
NASA's top management since the death of Dryden in 1965. Urey complained
to the President's Space Task Group, headed by Lee A. DuBridge, that he
did not know who was making decisions on the landing sites nor why they
were making these decisions. When he was informed of the selections, he
said, so many unfamiliar acronyms were used that the text was
undecipherable. When the scientists did take part in the selection
process later, according to one NASA mission planner, the situation did
not improve. Each scientist repeatedly voted for the site of his
preference, frequently resulting in a stalemate. In the end, NASA had to
step in and make the decision anyway.<a href =
"#source12"><b>12</b></a><p>
Urey was, however, just as critical of those who derisively called the
lunar samples "a bag of rocks."
<blockquote><p>What a magnificent bag! Rocks last melted 3.65 billion years
ago! Dust last chemically assembled 4.66 billion years ago back at the
very beginning of the solar system and of our mother earth. We have
those marvelous pictures of old mother earth as she floats in space.<a
href = "#source13"><b>13</b></a> </blockquote><p>
At the end of the sixties, then, Apollo had finished the job it was
designed to do: land men on the moon and return them safely within that
decade.<p>
Although <cite>Apollo 11</cite> was the most remembered of all the
flights and the primary source of arguments about whether America should
have sent men to the moon at all, that mission was actually an
engineering confirmation that astronauts could do the job. The missions
that followed - <cite>Apollo 12</cite> through <cite>Apollo 17</cite> -
were the limited exploitations of that capability. Study of the lunar
data collected by the 12 men who walked on the moon, and by the
experiments they left on the surface, would occupy scientists around the
world for more than a decade beyond the final flight in 1972. Already
the information had begun to give insights into how the moon, and hence
the earth, had evolved. And immediately, as early as <cite>Apollo
8,</cite> flights to another celestial body brought a new awareness of
the spaceship <cite>Earth</cite> and the need to preserve it.<p>
In a still larger sense, <cite>Apollo 11</cite> demonstrated that with
determination, time, and resources complex national goals could be
achieved. "If we can put men on the moon, we can . . ."; or,
"Why can't we . . . ?" - although an oversimplification -
became a benchmark for measuring progress, or a lack of it.<a href =
"#source14"><b>14</b></a><p>
Anthropologist Margaret Mead said on the eve of <cite>Apollo 11</cite>
that it could be "a first step, not into space alone, but into the
disciplined and courageous use of enhanced human powers for man,
ennobled as he is today, as the first men step on the moon." And
afterward historian Arthur Schlesinger declared:<p>
The 20th Century will be remembered, when all else is forgotten, as the
century when man burst his terrestrial bonds.<a href =
"#source15"><b>15</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c366.jpg" width=405 height=510 ALT="LC-39 dedicated"><p>
<cite>Five years later - 16 July 1974 - Launch Complex 39 was dedicated
as a national landmark.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source1"><b>1</b>.</a> Hugh L. Dryden, interview, Washington,
1 Sept. 1965.<p>
<a name = "source2"><b>2</b>.</a> James E. Webb to President John F.
Kennedy, "Reader's Digest Article on Space," 9 Aug. 1963.<p>
<a name = "source3"><b>3</b>.</a> <cite>Astronautics and Aeronautics,
1967: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Policy,</cite> NASA SP-4008
(Washington, 1968), p. 383; Philip E. Culbertson, NASA Hq., to Wilmot N.
Hess, MSC, 3 Jan. 1968.<p>
<a name = "source4"><b>4</b>.</a> André J. Meyer, Jr., minutes of
Lunar Mission Planning Board meetings, 13 and 29 Feb. 1968; NASA OMSF,
"The Plan for Lunar Exploration," February 1968; Robert R.
Gilruth, Dir., MSC, to George E. Mueller, NASA OMSF, 4 March and 1 April
1968.<p>
<a name = "source5"><b>5</b>.</a> Jacob E. Smart, NASA Hq., to Mueller,
8 May 1968; MSC, "Establishment of Lunar Exploration Working
Group," Announcement 68-63, 14 May 1968; John D. Hodge to Mgr.,
ASPO, "Lunar exploration support," 4 June 1968, with enc.,
Richard F. Baillie, MSC, "ELM Development," 23 April 1968;
Hodge to NASA Hq., Attn.: Rodney W. Johnson, "Comments on Proposed
FY 69 Advanced Lunar Missions Studies (981)," 2 Aug. 1968; Hodge to
NASA Hq., Attn.: Douglas R. Lord, "FY 1969 Advanced Manned Missions
Studies for MSC," 6 Aug. 1968.<p>
<a name = "source6"><b>6</b>.</a> Jim R. Elk, MSC, to Lunar and Earth
Sciences Div., Attn.: John M. Eggleston, "Accessibility of lunar
science sites," 5 Feb. 1968; Hess to Dir., Flight Ops.,
"Operational constraints for lunar landing missions after Mission
'G'," 6 Feb. 1968; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Dir., Flight
Operations, MSC, to Dir. Science and Applications, "Operational
constraints for the fourth lunar landing mission," 19 March 1968;
Robert B. Bristow, "A Feasibility Study of Advanced Missions to the
Lunar Craters Copernicus and Tycho," draft MSC Internal Note 67-ET-
, 18 April 1968.<p>
<a name = "source7"><b>7</b>.</a> Douglas R. Hendrickson to Dep. Dir.,
MSC, and Chief, Adm. Services Div., "Abolishment of the MSC Flight
Experiments Selection Board," 14 Aug. 1968, with enc.; MSC,
"Abolishment of the MSC Flight Experiments Selection Board,"
Announcement 68-118, 27 Aug. 1968; Meyer, minutes of Lunar Mission
Planning Board meeting, 23 Sept. 1968; Owen E. Maynard to Mgr., MSC
ASPO, "ASSB (Apollo Site Selection Board) Meeting - Trip
Report," 4 Oct. 1968; Benjamin Milwitzky to Dir., Apollo Lunar
Exploration Off., NASA OMSF, and Asst. Dir., Automated Systems,
"Biasing Apollo Missions to Land Near Surveyor Spacecraft on the
Moon," 10 Jan. 1969.<p>
<a name = "source8"><b>8</b>.</a> Hodge memo, "Extended Duration
Command and Service Module Study," 25 Feb. 1969, with enc.; MSC,
"Command and Service Module Statement of Work," 13 Feb. 1969
(rev. 17, 20, and 28 Feb. 1969); Hodge memo, "Statement of Work for
Phase B Design-Definition Study of Intermediate Size Lunar Landing
Spacecraft," 31 Dec. 1968, with enc., Hodge memo, "Phase B
Design-Definition Study of an Extended Lunar Module," 11 Dec. 1968,
with enc., "Statement of Work for Phase B Design-Definition Study
of an Extended Lunar Module," 6 Dec. 1968; "LM Modification
Study Statement of Work," 13 Feb. 1969 (rev. 24 and 28 Feb. 1969);
George M. Low memo, "Discussions with General Phillips concerning
advanced lunar missions," 25 April 1969; NASA OMSF Report to the
Admin., NASA, signed by Mueller, 26 May 1969; William E. Stoney, Jr.,
NASA OMSF, to MSC, Attn.: Joseph P. Loftus, "CSM Orbital Science
Missions," 15 May 1969.<p>
<a name = "source9"><b>9</b>.</a> Low memo, "Apollo scheduling
planning," 20 March 1969; NASA, "Apollo Flight Mission
Assignments," OMSF Directive M-D MA 500-11, SE 010-000-1, April
1969; D. R. Anselmo and J. L. Marshall, Jr., "Spacecraft Payload
and Mission Profile Changes for Lunar Exploration Mission - Case
310," Bellcomm, 17 March 1969; Maynard to Mgr., ASPO, "Apollo
Site Selection Board trip report - June 3, 1969," 10 June 1969; Low
TWX to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Lunar Landing Sites for H-1
Missions," 12 June 1969; Samuel C. Phillips TWX to Low, subj. as
above, 16 June 1969; Farouk El-Baz, OMSF, "Recommended Lunar
Exploration Sites (Apollo 11 through Apollo 20)," presented to the
ASSB, 10 July 1969; Phillips TWX to MSC, Attn.: Low, Kraft, and Donald
K. Slayton, 24 July 1969; Mueller Report, 28 July 1969; Meyer to Mgr.,
ASPO, "Surveyor 3 activities on Apollo 12 mission," 28 Aug.
1969.<p>
<a name = "source10"><b>10</b>.</a> Lee R. Scherer, NASA OMSF, TWX to
MSFC, MSC, and KSC, Attn.: Wernher von Braun and William R. Lucas,
Gilruth and Hodge, and Kurt H. Debus, 29 May 1969; Hodge memo,
"Requirements assessment for Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV)," 29
May 1969; idem, "Establishment of a working group for the
definition of the Manned Lunar Roving Vehicle," 10 July 1969; idem,
"Manned Lunar Roving Vehicle - Statement of Work," 17 July
1969; Meyer memo, "Lunar Roving Vehicle," 28 July 1969; Low
memo for record, "Lunar exploration," 13 Aug. 1969; Meyer to
Mgr., ASPO, "EVA capabilities on the lunar surface," 29 Aug.
1969; Hodge memo, "Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV) Contractor Technical
Proposal Evaluation," 18 Aug. 1969; <cite>Astronautics and
Aeronautics, 1969: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Policy,</cite>
NASA SP-4014 (Washington, 1970), p. 353; Boeing, "The Boeing Lunar
Rover," news release, 30 Oct. 1969.<p>
<a name = "source11"><b>11</b>.</a> John D. Stevenson TWX to KSC et al.,
"MSC Mission Operations Forecast for January 1969," 3 Jan.
1969; Mueller to Gilruth and Debus, 14 Feb. 1969; E. Dixon Murrah memo,
"Lunar Exploration Program Newsletter," 20 Feb. 1969; OMSF,
"Launch Readiness Flight Planning Schedule," April 1969; Hess
to Dir., MSC, "Six-month centers between lunar landing
missions," 9 May 1969, with enc.; Mueller Report, 28 July 1969;
Mueller to Llewellyn J. Evans, President, Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corp., 11 Aug. 1969.<p>
<a name = "source12"><b>12</b>.</a> A. J. Dessler, "Discontent of
Space-Science Community," MS for journal article, 30 Oct. 1969; MSC
news releases 69-54, 1 Aug., and 69-74, 27 Oct. 1969; President Richard
M. Nixon to the Vice President et al., no subj., 13 Feb. 1969; Milton W.
Rosen, NASA Hq., "Activities of President's Space Task Group and
NASA Internal Planning Groups," 7 April 1969; Harold C. Urey to
Charles H. Townes, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, and John Findley, National
Radio Astronomy Observatory, 27 Oct. 1969; Carl R. Huss to JSC History
Office, "Comments on Draft Copy of 'Chariots for Apollo . . .
,'" 2 Nov. 1976; NASA, "Lunar Science Conference Jan.
5–8," news release 69-170, 23 Dec. 1969.<p>
<a name = "source13"><b>13</b>.</a> "A Scientist on Space
Needs," <cite>Washington Post,</cite> 17 Sept. 1970.<p>
<a name = "source14"><b>14</b>.</a> NASA, "Lunar Science Stations
Cease Functioning Oct. 1," news release 77-203, 27 Sept. 1977;
<cite>Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968,</cite> NASA SP-4010
(Washington, 1969), pp. iii, 324-35; 1969, pp. iii, 2, 7, 20, 158-59,
198, 248-52; 1972, NASA SP-4017 (1974), pp. iii, 420-24, 426-39, 449.<p>
<a name = "source15"><b>15</b>.</a> Margaret Mead in "Prize - or
Lunacy?" <cite>Newsweek,</cite> 7 July 1969, p. 61; Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., quoted in House, <cite>Congressional Record,</cite>
94th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 Sept. 1976, p. H11946.
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